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Abstract 
This paper examines whether incumbent national governments of eleven member 
states of the European Union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal 
in order to create national political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan. The 
empirical evidence, based on data concerning the 1965-97 period, does not support 
this hypothesis. Rather, it appears that governments have pursued stabilization 
policies. 
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TAXATION AND POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN EU ECONOMIES 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This paper examines whether the national governments of the European Union (EU) 
member states have used tax policies as a means for the stabilization of their economies or for 
their reelection by creating national political business cycles (PBCs). If they have caused 
PBCs did these cycles exhibit comparable patterns over time and, perhaps, narrower in 
amplitude in the post-Maastricht (1992) era than in the preceding period? And in that case 
could these cycles be identified as being of an electoral-type or a partisan-type? Answers to 
such questions may illuminate the perspectives of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
states in respect to the coordination of their tax policies toward an eventual implementation of 
a federal-type fiscal organization in the years to come. These issues are examined for 
democratic societies with majoritarian and proportional political systems. The former systems 
have to do with two major political parties alternating in power; the latter involve a larger 
number of smaller parties and coalition governments.  
The benchmark year 1992 has triggered an era of rising expectations for a gradual loss of 
fiscal autonomy of the EU member states, due to the budget-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP 
criteria imposed by the Treaty of Maastricht. These criteria comprise a subset of the 
conditions required by the member states prior to their accession to the EMU and have to be 
sustained afterwards. Consequently, these requirements are to be reflected in the economic 
policies of national governments, regardless of ideological differences, and, hence, in less 
prominent national PBCs caused by tax policies in the post-1992 era relative to the preceding 
period (see also Alesina et al., 1997, chap.10).  
Political business cycle models feature the idea that, in majoritarian systems, governments 
acting in favor of their own political interests and/or the interests of particular pressure groups 
tend to stimulate aggregate demand in pre-election periods. Their actual policies before 
elections can give rise to electoral (opportunistic) or partisan cycles. Electoral cycles are 
defined as the persistent cyclical patterns of key target- and policy variables regardless of the 
ideological orientation of the incumbent government (Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976). 
Partisan cycles are defined as the persistent differences in such patterns conditional upon the 
ideology of the party in power (see, for instance, Hibbs, 1977, and Haynes and Stone, 1990). 
Both types of models make use of an exploitable Phillips curve. In terms of voters’ 
expectations, these models are considered as retrospective and naive. The counterparts of 
these models based on rational expectations are classified as rational electoral (Rogoff and 
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Sibert, 1988, and Rogoff, 1990) and rational partisan models (Alesina 1987, Alesina and 
Roubini 1993). Proportional political systems, with several parties forming coalition 
governments, are not prone to yield partisan cycles. Through policy moderation, coalition 
governments are slow to react to shocks due to the veto power by their members over the 
choice of policies [Alesina (1987 and Alesina et al. (1997) and the literature cited therein]. 
Moreover, they have a tendency to create larger budget deficits and build up government debt 
[Alesina et al. (1997)]. For a different view see De Haan and Sturm (1977). 
The empirical evidence in connection with PBCs caused by tax instruments is mixed. 
Among the studies lending support to this view are Tufte (1978), Mikesel (1978), Pack 
(1988), Bizer and Durlauf (1989), Cox and McCubbins (1991), Poterba (1994) and Yoo 
(1998). Against this view argue Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Hicks (1984), Karran (1985) 
and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990). With the exception of Yoo, who is concerned with the 
Japanese case, the other studies deal with the US economy. Most recently, Schukneht (2000) 
has examined fiscal policies in pre-election periods in twenty-four developing countries. His 
work indicates increasing public exp nditures rather than lowering taxes as a major political 
choice in pre-election periods. 
 Empirical evidence from the majority of eleven member states of the EU reveals a 
narrowing of the divergences observed in the evolution of the structures of direct and indirect 
taxes from the early 1970s to the late 1990s (post Maastricht period) as the coefficients of 
variation in Table 1 indicate.1 A question is whether the above changes reflect stabilization 
through tax policies or are intended pre-election period actions of incumbent governments 
seeking to improve their reelection prospects. In the latter case, it is of interest to investigate 
whether the changes observed during the 1965-97 period can be distinguished in accord with 
the ideological position of the incumbent governments, liberal and socialist, and/or coalition 
type.  
We shall examine the pre- and post-election period influences of incumbent governments 
on the cycles of key target variables and tax instruments as well as the two major components 
of the latter, direct and indirect taxes, in the EU member states during the 1970-97 period.  
                                                     
1 From the fifteen member states of the EU, our analysis excludes Luxembourg due to data unavailability as well 
as Austria, Finland and Sweden are not examined due to the length of our data set (1965-1997) and their so-to-
speak late accession (1995) in the EU. A longer time period was not available due to the lack of statistical data 
concerning various categories of the variables employed in the countries of the sample.  For the same reasons, 
the ten new members of the EU as of spring 2003 are also not examined. 
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Methodological issues are discussed in the following section and a description of the data 
is provided in Section 3. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions and 
policy implications are in the last section. 
 
 
Table 1: Structure and Percentage Shares of Tax Instruments in GDP,  
European Union States 1968-1997 
 
Countries/dates   TD/T TYP/T TYC/T TP/T TI/T TGS/T TSS/T TOS/T T/GDP TD/IT 
BEL:1968-73 
     1993-97 
50.9 
60.1 
36.3 
46.5 
10.0 
9.6 
4.6 
4.0 
49.1 
39.9 
29.6 
22.9 
16.6 
12.9 
2.9 
4.0 
24.3 
30.5 
1.04 
1.51 
DEN:1968-73 
       1993-97 
60.0 
65.5 
51.0 
56.9 
2.8 
4.7 
6.2 
3.8 
40.0 
34.5 
18.0 
20.8 
18.7 
12.0 
3.4 
1.8 
39.0 
48.1 
1.50 
1.90 
FRA:1968-73 
      1993-97 
35.7 
46.1 
19.9 
26.4 
9.4 
9.3 
6.5 
10.5 
64.3 
53.9 
43.7 
34.1 
19.1 
17.6 
1.4 
2.2 
20.5 
22.6 
0.56 
0.86 
GER:1968-73 
      1993-97 
55.2 
53.4 
  40.9 
  43.1 
8.6 
5.7 
5.7 
4.7 
44.8 
46.6 
23.6 
29.4 
18.7 
15.4 
2.5 
1.8 
23.2 
26.6 
1.23 
1.15 
GRE:1968-73 
       1993-97 
32.9 
34.4 
14.6 
18.9 
3.6 
9.8 
14.7 
5.7 
67.1 
65.6 
26.1 
37.7 
41.0 
27.9 
0.0 
0.0 
14.0 
19.7 
0.49 
0.52 
IRE:1968-73 
    1993-97 
45.5 
54.4 
23.1 
38.0 
7.8 
10.9 
14.6 
5.5 
54.5 
45.6 
14.0 
25.1 
40.4 
20.5 
0.1 
0.0 
26.1 
28.6 
0.83 
1.19 
ITA:1968-73 
    1993-97 
40.6 
60.2 
18.9 
38.5 
11.3 
13.6 
10.3 
8.1 
59.4 
39.8 
21.7 
20.2 
34.3 
15.4 
3.5 
4.2 
16.3 
28.8 
0.68 
1.51 
NET:1968-73 
       1993-97 
58.5 
54.2 
42.0 
33.0 
10.8 
14.1 
5.6 
7.1 
41.5 
45.8 
21.2 
26.1 
19.9 
15.2 
2.4 
4.5 
24.2 
26.4 
1.41 
1.18 
    POR:1968-73 
             1993-97 
40.5 
40.8 
34.2 
37.4 
- 
- 
6.3 
3.4 
59.5 
59.2 
13.2 
30.7 
43.2 
27.6 
3.0 
0.9 
13.6 
24.7 
0.68 
0.69 
SPA:1968-73 
      1993-97 
43.9 
55.0 
19.1 
36.8 
14.2 
9.4 
10.6 
8.8 
56.1 
45.0 
31.6 
25.1 
24.4 
16.1 
0.2 
3.8 
10.4 
21.8 
0.78 
1.22 
UK:1968-73 
  1993-97 
64.6 
56.9 
38.4 
32.4 
9.7 
11.4 
16.5 
13.1 
35.4 
43.1 
8.0 
24.1 
24.6 
17.0 
2.8 
2.0 
28.3 
28.8 
1.82 
1.32 
                                     Statistics 
 
1968-73   
          
x  48.01 30.75 8.83 4.63 51.99 22.92 27.03 2.03 24.15 1.01 
s 10.24 11.75 3.45 0.71 10.24 9.73 10.45 1.49 6.82 0.43 
V 0.21 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.20 0.42 0.39 0.73 0.28 0.43 
               
             1993-97 
          
x    52.82 37.08 10.32 4.07 47.17 26.94 17.96 2.28 20.05 1.19 
          s  8.82 9.84 3.44 0.25 8.82 5.36 5.23 1.61 7.10 0.38 
            V   
   
0.17 0.27 0.33 0.44 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.71 0.35 0.32 
 
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, various issues.   
 Notes: Country initials refer to eleven states of EU.   Symbol – indicates that Portuguese data do not distinguish between TYP and TYC (see 
definitions of variables, below). The tax categories at issue are included in TYP.  
Definitions of variables: TD = direct taxes (current taxes on income and wealth, excluding social security); TI = indirect taxes  (current taxes on 
imports and production). T= TD + TI. TYP = taxes on income of individuals, TYC = taxes on profits of corporations, TP = taxes on the use, 
ownership or transfer of property, TGS = taxes on the production, leasing, transfer, delivery or sales of goods, TSS = excise taxes, TOS = TI – 
(TGS + TSS), and GDP = gross domestic product.  Additional details on the tax variables are given in Section 3. Symbols x , s and V denote the 
average value, standard deviation and coefficient of variation, respectively, of the variables appearing in the respective columns. Due to rounding 
errors, the structures of taxes, TD/T and TI/T, may not add up to 100. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
Page 5 of 50
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
   
 
2.  Methodology 
According to the expectations hypotheses embodied in the PBC models, these can be 
classified as first or second-generation models. In the former group are the electoral cycle 
(EC) and the partisan cycle (PC) models. In the second group are the rational electoral (REC) 
and the rational partisan cycle (RPC) models.  
Concerning first generation models, the EC models emphasize the incumbent political 
party’s intention to secure reelection by maximizing its expected vote share at the next 
election. To that end, the models hypothesize a backward-looking private sector that judges 
the government by its past track record, and a short-sighted government systematically 
fooling a myopic electorate by judiciously exploiting a short-run Phillips curve trade-off 
during its tenure in office. The resulting EC hypothesis to be tested is: Governments, 
regardless of ideological orientation, adopt expansionary (contractionary) policies in the late 
(early) year(s) of their term in office in order to depress the rate of unemployment (inflation) 
at the expense of a higher inflation (more unemployment). On the other hand, the PC models 
stress that incumbents follow partisan macroeconomic policies. That is, they assign different 
weights to inflation and unemployment, since they represent different pressure groups with 
dissimilar preferences, incentives and objectives. The emerging testable EC hypothesis states 
that socialist or left wing parties give greater weight to unemployment than inflation vis-à-vis 
right wing or liberal parties. The parties might maintain these policies during their tenure in 
office. However, they switch to opportunistic policies if their reelection is in jeopardy (Frey 
and Schneider, 1978). 
Regarding models of the second generation, the REC models emphasize the role of 
temporary information asymmetries in explaining electoral cycles in macroeconomic policy 
instruments, e.g. taxes, transfers, government consumption spending and money growth, 
rather than in indicators of economic performance (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). 
  
On account of their information advantages, the incumbent governments have an 
incentive to try to signal their competence in pre-election periods by manipulating the policy 
instruments. Their ulterior motive is to revert to their traditional policy actions after the 
election. That is, the end result of their pre-election actions is to fool the public and create 
cycles in the policy instruments, and, conceivably affect the real variables before the election.  
The RPC models consider two ideologically different parties, notably socialists versus 
liberals, with ideologies, objectives and incentives known to an informed and rational public. 
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In the context of a short- run Phillips curve tradeoff, socialists are expected to be more averse 
to unemployment and less averse to inflation than liberals. In turn, rational voters anticipate 
the incentives of the alternative policymakers and form their expectations accordingly. In 
brief, RPC models predict a transitory expansion (contraction) at the beginning of a socialist 
(liberal) administration and a tapering off in the effects of their different policies on inflation 
and unemployment in the later part of their term in office. Inflation is predicted to be 
permanently higher with socialist rather than with liberal administrations. For a survey and 
overview see Gärtner (1994). 
In our empirical analysis we search for basic stylized facts of electoral and partisan 
cycles, retrospective or rational, in tax instruments and key target variables across EU 
economies. To extract the cycle component of a time series, we employ the widely used 
Hodrick-Prescott (1980, 1997) univariate, detrending procedure, hereafter referred to as HP 
filter. This is a cyclical filter designed to derive a smoothed trend, tτ , from a given time series 
, where  stands for the series of any tax or target variable considered and is expressed in 
logarithms, unless it is in percentage form. The smoothed trend represents the growth 
component of series . Any deviation of the actual time series from its smoothed trend 
defines the cycle component of the series,  hereinafter. In the empirical analysis we 
focus upon this variable and try to explain it in terms of political dummies and other relevant 
regressors.    
tz tz
tz
tdevz
The smoothed trend or growth component of a time series , tz T,...,1t = , tτ , is obtained 
from the solution of the convex minimization detrending problem:  
               ])()[()z(min 21tt
1T
2t t1t
T
1t
2
tt
t
−
−
= += −−−+− ∑∑ ττττλττ , λ>0                        (1) 
The deviation ttz τ−  is the filtered series and the Lagrange multiplier λ  is a smoothing 
parameter. At the annual frequency, a value of the smoothing parameter λ  equal to 100 is 
most often used (Backus and Kehoe (1992), Ravn and Uhlig (1997)).2  
In the empirical analysis, we focus upon variable  and try to explain it in terms of tdevz
political dummies and other relevant regressors. Earlier studies have used as regressands the 
                                                     
2 Theoretically, λ can take any value from zero to infinity. When λ is equal to infinity (zero) the solution to the 
constrained minimization problem is a linear trend (the original series). Recently, Ravn and Uhlig (1997) have 
strongly recommended a new HP filter adjustment rule, according to which any value of λ  between 6.25 and 
8.25 is a reasonable choice. Their finding is in agreement with the Baxter and King (1995) proposition that the 
HP filter approximates the ideal band-pass filter when λ =10.  
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rates of change of ’s or their ratios to GDP, and as arguments of the relevant regressions tz
political and non-political dummies. For instance, Alesina and Roubini (1992, 1993), Alesina 
and Peroti (1995) and Schuknecht (2000) have regressed fiscal variables or their ratios to 
GDP on political and non-political dummies. 
In order to detect electoral or partisan cycle regularities of tax and target variables, we 
employ the following procedure. First, we apply HP filtering for each target- and tax 
instrument variable and get the series . Second, we estimate the regression model (2) at tdevz
various levels of disaggregation of the variables involved. 
                                             (2) itdevz it
q
1p
*
MMtiptp1t,ii ddddevz εδγβα ∑
=
− ++++=
 
where  stands for the cycle component of the time series of each tax and target 
variable , =1,…13, per EU country.
itdevz itz
i i 3 Symbol denotes the pre- and post- election year 
political dummy variables specific to each EU member country examined (see Section 3). In 
this expression, variables  and  stand for the persistence of the cycle and the 
effects of the political factors, respectively. Variables  and , are two dummies intended 
to capture the impact of the Treaty of Maastrict (1992) on the dependent variable. In 
particular,  measures the possible change in the amplitude of the cycle due to the 
Maastricht criteria; it takes a zero value befor  1992 and a value of one otherwise. 
Variable  is an interaction dummy intended to capture whether the political effects on the 
dependent variable have been neutralized or weakened in pre-election periods in the aftermath 
of the Treaty. The interaction dummy is defined as the product , where  is a 
pre-election year dummy variable (see end of section 3 for details). The last term in (2) is an 
error term with the usual properties. 
iptd
1t,idevz − iptd
Mtd
*
Md
Mtd
*
Md
eMt
*
M ddd ⋅= ed
 
3.  The data 
Our empirical analysis concerns eleven EU member countries, notably, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK. It is based on a sample of 33 annual observations covering 1965-1997. There are five 
target variables and eight tax instruments. The target variables include gross domestic 
product, GDP, personal disposable income, YD, private consumption expenditure, C, and the 
                                                     
3 To avoid overburdening the analysis with symbols, a country specific subscript is omitted from all variables in 
(2). 
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rates of unemployment u and inflation (rate of change of GDP deflator)π . The tax variables 
include direct taxes (current taxes on income and wealth) TD and indirect taxes (taxes linked 
to imports and production) TI as well as their most important sub-categories. In the group of 
direct taxes included are personal income taxes, TYP, corporate income taxes, TYC, and 
property taxes, TP. In the group of indirect taxes included are taxes on general goods and 
services, TGS, taxes on specific goods and services, TSS, and taxes on other goods and 
services, TOS. With the exception of the rates of unemployment and inflation, which are in 
percentage form, the remaining variables are expressed in 1990 prices. The data come from 
the OECD publications National Accounts, Volume II (variables GDP, YD and C), and 
Revenue Statistics (all tax variables) and the Commission of the European Communities, 
European Economy (the remaining variables).4   
 The dates of parliamentary elections and the types of the government formed are given 
in Table 2. An overview on the information in this table reveals the following: (1) Three 
countries, namely Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, have proportional type 
political systems, which have given rise to coalition governments. (2) The remaining 
countries have a majoritarian system that interchanges two parties in power. (3) In two 
countries, Ireland and Portugal, the two major parties have been non-socialist (Fianna Fail 
and Fine Gael-Labor party) and non-conservative (Socialist and Social Democratic), 
respectively. (4) In France, the control of the presidency and the government has not always 
been in the hands of the same party (cohabitation). (5) In three countries, notably Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, the parliamentary system was suspended for a number of years (Greece, 
1967-74) or was revived in the mid-seventies (Portugal, 1975; Spain, 1977). Finally, 
Germany was reunified in 1989. 
On the basis of the outcomes of the national elections  (Table 2), we constructed the pre- 
and post election year dummy variables reported in Tables A-2 and A-3 in the Appendix. In 
                                                     
4 Variables TYP and TYC include taxes levied on income of individuals and profits (gross income minus allowable tax 
relieves) on corporations, taxes levied on capital gains and gains from gambling. Variable TP covers recurrent 
and non-recurrent taxes on the use, ownership or transfer of property. TGS stands for all taxes, other than import 
and export duties, levied on the production, leasing, transfer, delivery or sales of a wide range of goods and/or 
the rendering of a wide range of services, irrespective of whether they are domestically produced or imported 
and irrespective of the stage of production or distribution at which they are levied, i.e. value-added taxes, sales 
taxes and multi-stage cumulative taxes. TSS includes excise taxes, taxes on profits generated and transferred 
from fiscal monopolies, customs and import duties as well as taxes on exports, foreign exchange transactions, 
investment goods and betting stakes and special taxes on services, which do not form part of a general tax. TOS 
is a residual tax item on receipts from goods and services. Finally, TD = TYP + TYC + TP and TI = TGS + TSS 
+ TOS. All variables in levels are expressed at national currencies.  
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doing so we divided particular calendar years according to the proportion of total months in a 
year that each party spent in power. The calculations were based on the definition of the 
election year as the 12- month period ending at the end of the month of the election. Thus, ecd  
 esd  are the election-year dummies associated with the incumbent government  – 
conservative (liberal) and socialist, respectively – administering the election;  and  are 
the respective post-election year dummies. These political dummy variables were used in 
regression equations designed to test for partisan cycles in the EU countries (sub-section 4.2). 
For the respective regressions intended to test for electoral cycles, we collapsed the above 
pre-election year dummies  and , and the post-election year ones, i.e.  and , into 
two dummy variables, notably  and , respectively (sub-section 4.1).
and
                                                     
ncd nsd
ecd esd ncd nsd
ed nd
5 Finally, an 
additional dummy, , for Greece, Portugal and Spain was employed. This variable accounted for the 
time intervals these three countries were governed by dictatorial governments, and takes a unit value 
for the periods these countries were under dictatorial rule and zero otherwise.
Dd
6
5 For the construction of the dummy variables see also Alogoskoufis et.al. (1992).  
6 Variable  assumes the value one from 1967 (April) to 1974 (July) in the case of Greece, and for the years 
before 1975 (April) and 1977 (July) for Portugal and Spain, respectively.  
Dd
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Table 2. Dates of Parliamentary Elections in EU Countries 
Year BEL DEN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NET POR SPA UK 
1964  9:SOC CON  CON 2:SOC   COL D D 10:LAB 
1965 5:COL   9:COL  4:FF   D D  
1966  11:CON       D D 4:LAB 
1967   3:CON     4:D   2:COL D D  
1968 3:COL 1:CON 6:CON  D  5:COL  D D  
1969    9:SOC D 6:FF   D D  
1970     D    D D 6:CON 
1971 11:COL 9:MINS   D   4:COL D D  
1972    11:SOC D  5:COL 11:COL D D  
1973  12:MINS 3:CON  D 2:FGL   D D  
1974 3:COL    11:CON    D D 2:10:LAB 
1975  1:SOC       4:SOC D  
1976    10:SOC   6:COL  4:SOC D  
1977 4:COL 2:SOC   10:CON 6:FF  5:COL  6:CON  
1978 12:COL  3:CON         
1979  10:SOC     6:COL  12:SPD 3:CON 5:CON 
1980   6:SOC 10:SOC     10:SPD   
1981 11:COL 12:SOC   6:SOC 6:FGL  5:COL    
1982      2:11:FF  9:COL  10:SOC  
1983    3:CON   6:COL  4:SOC  6:CON 
1984  1:CON          
1985 10:COL    6:SOC    10:SPD   
1986   3:CON     5:COL  6:SOC  
1987 12:COL 9:CON  1:CON  3:FF 6:COL  7:SPD  6:CON 
1988  5:CON 3:SOC         
1989     6:COL 6:FF  9:COL  10:SOC  
1990  12:CON  12:CON 4:CON       
1991 11:COL        10:SPD   
1992      11:FF 4:COL    4:CON 
1993   3:CON  10:SOC     6:MINS  
1994  9:SOC  10:CON   3:COL 5:COL    
1995 5:COL        10:SOC   
1996     9:SOC  4:COL   3:CON  
1997   6:SOC   6:FF     5:LAB 
Sources: Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections, Publications of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, Switzerland, annual issues. 
Notes: a. Numbers in cells, preceding types of government, indicate months of election. D = dictatorship era. 
           b. Abbreviations of types of government: 
              1. COL =coalition, 2. CON = conservative, 3. LAB = labor, 4. FF = Fianna Fail coalition,                
              5. FGL = Fine Gael +labor coalition, 6. SPD = social democratic (right), 7. MINS = minority-socialist, 8. SOC = socialist. 
           c. In Ireland (1982), the UK (1974) and Greece (1989) two elections took plac , in which FF and FGL, respectively, in Ireland;       
              New Democracy (conservatives) in Greece; and LAB in the UK won the elections. 
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4.  Empirical results 
 
 
The empirical analysis is aimed at the detection of electoral and/or partisan cycle 
regularities.  The respective results are discussed in sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2. The effects of 
the Treaty of Maastricht on these cycles are given in sub-section 4.3. 
 
4.1. Electoral cycle regularities  
In order to detect the impact of pre-electoral policies on the formation of cycles of tax 
instruments and target variables in the individual member countries of the EU, regardless of 
the ideology of the government in power, we estimate the following version of the regression 
model (2): 
                                          (3) itdevz itD
q
1p
*
MMtiptp1t,ii dddddevz εζδγβα +++++= ∑
=
−
where  is the cycle component of the time series of the tax and target variables itdevz
examined. The explanatory variables examined in the country regressions are: (a) the lagged 
dependent variable; (b) political dummy variables, idiosyncratic to the country under 
consideration; (c) a dummy variable  taking a zero value before 1992 (Treaty of Mtd
Maastricht) and a unit value otherwise, and an interaction dummy *Md ., the product of Mtd  , i.e
and the political dummy etd  (see below). For the case of Germany, variable Md  is redefined 
to account for the reunification of the country in December 1989. In this case it assumes the 
values zero and one before 1990 and afterwards, respectively. The country political dummies 
iptd  are defined as  and ntd ; they represent the pre-election 12-month period and the post etd
election years, but the last one, of the incumbent government, respectively. Variables 
1t,idevz − , Mtd , 
*
Md , and e u d  contro ng for the influence of all factors other than Dd  wer se for lli
the political factors in the itdevz  equation. In the es ion of equation (3), we choose timat
)q,p(ARMA  specifications as the “best” procedure for reducing short-run noise in all cases 
in which OLS estimates were not satisfactory.7  
                                                     
7  In fact, the various versions of equation (3) were estimated with OLS. To all estimated regressions that 
performed well in terms of the autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and CUSUM (cumulative sum of squares) 
tests, we applied the Newey-West procedure. In all remaining cases we experimented with the ARMA approach. 
This approach involves an iterative three-stage procedure of identification, estimation and diagnostic checking. 
Model identification tools such as SACF (sample autocorrelation function), SPCF (sample partial 
autocorrelation function) were used for identifying adequate models. For model selection we used Schwartz’s 
SBC as the model selection criterion. The optimal order of the model is chosen by the value of m, which is a 
function of p and q, so that SBC(m) is minimum. 
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      For simplicity, after controlling for the other factors potentially influencing the electoral 
cycles of the tax- and the target variables mentioned above, the discussion is mainly restricted 
to the statistically significant estimates of the pre- and post-election year political dummies, 
as well as the effects of the Treaty of Maastricht on the cycles in question. In that respect, we 
present only the direction (signs: plus or minus) of the statistically significant coefficients at 
the 5% probability level of the political dummies in Tables 3-5. 
 
4.1.1. Direct taxes and their components   
The regression results for the electoral cycle regularities in total direct taxes and their 
major components are reported in Table 3 (columns 1-4).  On an overall basis, these results 
suggest that the great majority of the governments in power in the EU countries have not 
significantly propagated political business cycles. The estimates indicate that the insignificant 
coefficients of the political regressors  and  have counted for approximately 85% of all 
estimated coefficients of these regressors. This fact alone suggests the robustness of our 
findings. These findings are in agreement with the tax policies pursued by the EU nations in 
the 1980s and the early 1990s for the purpose of reducing their large deficits, which were 
accumulated in the 1970s by means of stabilization policies.
ed nd
8  In the remaining cases, where 
the political regressors have significantly affected the cycles of the tax variables, the results 
were mixed. From among these, it is of interest to note that governments in Spain reduced the 
cycle of the corporate income tax in pre-election periods but increased it afterwards. On the 
other hand, governments in Denmark and Germany increased the cycles of property taxes, 
and personal income taxes, respectively, before elections and reduced them in post-election 
periods.  
 
                                                     
8 See, for instance, Saunders and Klau (1985), Graham and Seldom (1990) and Aldcroft (2001).  
 11
Page 13 of 50
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
   
 
TABLE 3: Testing for Electoral Cycles via Regression (3) 
Tax  Variables Target    Variables Countries, 
Dummies TD 
(1) 
TYP
(2) 
TYC
(3) 
TP 
(4) 
TI 
(5) 
TGS 
(6) 
TSS 
(7) 
TOS 
(8) 
GDP 
(9) 
YD 
(10) 
C 
(11) 
u  
(12) 
π  
(13) 
BEL:  ed
nd  
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
DEN:  ed
nd  
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
+ 
- 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
FRA:  ed
nd  
 
… 
… 
 
… 
.. 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
- 
+ 
… 
... 
 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
... 
... 
 
- 
... 
 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
 
GER:  ed
nd  
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
+ 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
GRE:  ed
nd  
 
… 
... 
 
+ 
… 
 
... 
... 
 
… 
… 
 
- 
+ 
… 
... 
 
... 
… 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
… 
 
... 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
 IRE:      ed
                nd
 
+ 
… 
 
+ 
- 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
+ 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
+ 
... 
 
+ 
- 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
   
… 
… 
 
+ 
- 
 
ITA:  ed
nd  
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
 
- 
+ 
 
… 
... 
 
... 
… 
 
- 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
 
- 
… 
NET:  ed
nd  
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
- 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
... 
... 
 
POR:  ed
nd  
 
… 
- 
 
… 
  - 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
 - 
 
- 
... 
- 
… 
 
- 
… 
 
- 
+ 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
- 
+ 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
+ 
 
SPA:  ed
nd  
 
… 
... 
 
- 
+ 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
... 
... 
 
+ 
... 
 
- 
+ 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
U.K:  ed
nd  
 
… 
… 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
- 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
… 
 
+ 
… 
 
… 
... 
 
… 
... 
 
- 
+ 
 
Note: The definitions of the tax-and target variables appearing in the various cells are given in Section 3. 
The statistically significant coefficients, at the 5% level, are reported by their plus or minus signs. The 
three dots, … , signify statistically insignificant coefficients. 
 
4.1.2. Indirect taxes and their components  
        The statistically significant estimates of the political regressors in Table 4 (columns 5-
8) represent only the 24% of all relevant estimated coefficients. From these, only the 
results pertaining to the cycles of total indirect taxes in Greece, taxes on general goods and 
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services in France and Italy, taxes on specific goods and services in Spain and taxes on 
other goods and services in France and Portugal are consistent with the electoral cycle 
hypothesis.  
 
4.1.3.Target variables    
        Finally, the statistically significant coefficients associated with the cycles of the 
target variables (Table 3, columns 9-13) do not exceed 15% of all related estimates. These 
latter estimates suggest that incumbent governments have managed to decrease in pre-election 
periods the cycles of real GDP in France and Italy, real disposable income in Italy, real 
private consumption expenditure in Portugal and the rate of inflation in the UK, but increased 
them in post election periods. In Ireland, government actions led to increases of the cycle of 
the rate of inflation before elections and decreases after elections.  
In relation to the above results, earlier studies employing different country samples and 
time periods have detected evidence for electoral cycles in tax instruments. In particular, 
Tufte (1978), using the1961-72 US data, found that tax increases were most probable in post- 
than pre-election years (our emphasis). Poterba (1994), using US data at the state level for the 
1988-92 period, confirmed the hypothesis that tax increases are significantly smaller prior to 
gubernatorial elections than afterwards. Pack (1987, 1988) provides evidence for politically 
motivated business cycles on the revenue- but not on the expenditure side of the budget in the 
US for the 1957-81 time span. By using panel data from a sample of twenty OECD countries 
for the 1960-87 period, Alesina and Roubini (1993) provide evidence of electoral-type cycles 
on monetary and fiscal (taxes, government spending) variables. Yoo (1998) finds a political 
tax cycle in Japan during the 1953-92 period. Schuknecht (2000), using a sample of twenty-
four developing countries for the 1973-92 period, finds that incumbent governments tend to 
increase public investment rather than lowering taxes prior to elections.  
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4.2. Partisan cycle regularities 
To detect whether conservative (liberal) or socialist administrations have exerted 
political influence on the cycles of the tax and target variables, we estimated an alternative 
version of the regression model (3).9 In that version we reinterpreted the political dummies 
 to account for the potential impact on the economy of each of the two parties, when in 
power, before and after the elections. The construction of the political dummy variables at 
issue is discussed in Section 3. As in the preceding section, we present only the direction 
(signs: plus or minus) of the statistically significant coefficients of the political dummies in 
Table 4.
iptd
10
The regression results for partisan-cycle regularities in tax instruments and target 
variables are reported in Table 4. The results are similar to those discussed for the electoral 
cycle regularities. This implies that the great majority of the EU governments, conservative or 
socialist, did not significantly affect the cycles of the tax- and target variables involved. In the 
following subsections we briefly discuss results consistent with partisan cycles.   
 
4.2.1. Direct and indirect taxes and their components 
The statistically significant coefficients in the partisan cycle regressions concerning direct taxes 
and their components indicate that (a) conservatives in Spain decreased the cycle of the corporate 
income tax before election periods and increased it after elections; and (b) socialists in Germany and 
Spain reduced the cycle of direct taxes and property taxes, respectively in pre- election periods but 
reversed their policies after elections. Concerning indirect tax s, conservatives in Portugal (Social 
Democrats) and Spain reduced the cycles of taxes on specific goods and services in pre-election 
periods, but reversed their policies afterwards. Similar policies were pursued by socialist 
administrations in France and Germany in relation to the cycle of taxes on other goods and services. 
The remaining results do not conform to the requirements of partisan cycles. Hence, no case can be 
made for partisan cycle regularities in direct and indirect taxes throughout the EU for the period of the 
sample. 
4.2.2 Target variables 
The statistically significant estimates for the target variables indicate that both parties 
(taken separately), when in power, have mainly reduced the partisan cycles of the variables 
                                                     
9 The three countries with a proportional political system, notably, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, are not 
examined here.  
10 The detailed estimates of the above cycles of tax- and target variables as functions of the political dummies 
and other non-political regressors are available upon request. 
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involved (Table 4, columns 9-13). More specifically, in pre-election periods, socialists in 
France, Germany and Ireland (Fine-Gael/Labor coalition), and conservatives in Portugal 
(Social Democrats) and Spain have reduced the cycles of various categories of the target 
variables cited in Table 4.  It  is  of  interest  to  note  here that most conservative 
governments 
TABLE 4: Testing for Partisan Cycles via Regression (3) 
Tax Variables Target Variables Countries, 
Dummies TD 
(1) 
TYP
(2) 
TYC
(3) 
TP 
(4) 
TI 
(5) 
TGS 
(6) 
TSS 
(7) 
TOS 
(8) 
GDP 
(9) 
YD 
(10) 
C 
(11) 
u  
(12) 
π  
(13) 
DEN: dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
...  
... 
... 
- 
... 
… 
… 
- 
 
… 
+ 
… 
… 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
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... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
- 
… 
… 
… 
 
FRA:dec 
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+ 
... 
... 
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+ 
- 
… 
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… 
- 
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... 
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... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
… 
- 
... 
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- 
... 
... 
 
... 
- 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
+ 
... 
... 
 
- 
- 
... 
... 
 
GER:dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
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- 
... 
+ 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
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... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
- 
... 
+ 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
- 
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- 
... 
... 
... 
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- 
... 
... 
 
... 
- 
... 
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... 
... 
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... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
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... 
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... 
... 
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... 
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... 
... 
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_ 
... 
+ 
... 
 
… 
... 
+ 
... 
 
_ 
... 
+ 
... 
 
... 
... 
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+ 
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... 
... 
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... 
 
... 
... 
... 
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Note: The definitions of the tax-and target variables appearing in the various cells are given in Section 
3. The statistically significant coefficients, at the 5% level, are reported by their plus or minus signs. 
The three dots, … , signify statistically insignificant coefficients. 
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reduced the cycle of the rate of inflation in pre-election periods. In conclusion, the empirical 
evidence does not lend support to partisan cycle regularities in the key target variables 
examined in the EU countries under consideration during the period of the sample. 
4.2.3 Treaty of Maastricht and cycles of instruments and targets 
The impact of the Treaty of Maastricht on the cycles of the tax instruments and the 
target variables examined, as measured by the statistically significant coefficients of the 
dummy variables  and  (regression 3) in the eleven EU member countries, is reported 
in Table 5. The statistically significant estimates correspond to about 15% of all cases 
considered. This suggests that the impact of the Treaty of Maastricht on the cycles in question 
in the post 1992 era has been limited. This is justified by the fact that most of the countries 
involved had already been in a process of tax policy convergence, long before the initiation of 
the Treaty, with the ultimate objective of forming the EMU in the future.
Md
*
Md
11
 
TABLE 5: Impact of Treaty of Maastricht on Cycles of Tax- and Target Variables 
Dummies in regressions of: 
 Tax Variables Target Variables 
Countries 0>Md  0<Md
 
0* >Md  0* <Md  0>Md
 
0<Md  0* >Md  0* <Md  
BEL … … TD,TYP,TYC … … … YD … 
DEN … TD … … … … C … 
FRA … TGS TI, TGS … … GDP,C GDP,YD, C … 
GER … … … … … … … … 
GRE … … TI TYP … … … … 
IRE TSS … … … π … … … 
ITA TYP … TP … … YD YD, π … 
NET … TYP TYP … … … … … 
POR TD,TYP … TGS,TOS TD,TYP … π … … 
SPA … TYP TYP,TYC TGS … … … u 
UK TP … TGS … … … Π … 
Note: The definitions of the tax-and target variables appearing in the various cells are given in Section 3. The 
statistically significant coefficients (5% level) of the Maastricht related dummies in the EU country regressions of 
the cycles of the variables at issue are reported by their plus or minus signs. The three dots, … , signify statistically 
insignificant coefficients. 
 
 
                                                     
11 The source of the information in this table is estimates of regression (3) in association with the search of 
electoral cycles. Degrees of freedom problems prevented comparable estimates for the case of partisan cycles. 
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5. Summary and conclusion 
In this paper we have searched for electoral and partisan cycle regularities in tax 
instruments and target variables in eleven EU member countries for the 1965-1997 period. 
The conclusion emerging from the empirical analysis does not lend support to the presence of 
electoral- or partisan cycle type hypotheses in the EU. Indications of political business cycles 
in the tax instruments and the target variables used are scanty. The great majority of the 
results suggest that the national governments of the EU countries did not take policy actions 
leading to the creation of electoral or partisan cycles in tax instruments and target variables. 
Our findings rather suggest that the EU governments have been primarily concerned with the 
pursuit of stabilization policies rather than with policies giving rise to political cycles, with 
the intent of curing the inflation and unemployment problems of the 1970s and 1980s. This 
result is encouraging, in the sense that it underlies a convergence of the tax policies pursued 
by the majority of the individual member countries of the Union in the pre-1997 period. It 
therefore facilitates the task of the European Commission in leading toward a federal type tax 
policy in the EMU in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A- 1. Election and Post Election Year Dummy Variables Used in the Estimation 
of Partisan Cycles-Type Regressions, EU 1964-1997 
Denmark France Germany Greece Year 
ecd  esd  ncd nsd  ecd  esd  ncd nsd  ecd esd  ncd nsd ecd  esd  ncd nsd  
1964 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1965 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.0.0 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1966 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1967 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1968 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1969 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1970 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1971 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1973 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1976 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 
1977 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 
1978 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 
1981 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.17 
1982 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1983 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1984 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
1985 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
1986 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1987 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1988 0.42 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
1989 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
1990 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 
1991 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1992 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 
1993 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.17 
1994 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 
1996 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table A- 1 (continued) Election and Post Election Year Dummy Variables Used in the 
Estimation of Partisan Cycles-Type Regressions, EU 1964-97 
Ireland Portugal Spain United Kingdom Year 
ecd  esd  ncd nsd  ecd  esd  ncd nsd  ecd esd  ncd nsd ecd  esd  ncd nsd  
1964 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 
1965 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 
1966 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 
1967 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1968 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1969 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 
1970 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1971 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1973 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1976 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1977 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.42 
1979 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.58 0.00 
1980 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1984 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1986 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.42 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1987 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1988 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1989 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1991 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.00 
1992 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 
1993 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1994 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1995 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1996 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.42 0.00 
1997 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.58 
 Source: Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections, Publications of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, Switzerland (annual 
issues) for the years 1964-1990 and 1991-97. 
 Note: All countries with proportional political systems are not included in this analysis. Sweden is also not included due to 
her late accession to the EU. See text. 
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Table A-2. Election and Post Election Year Dummy Variables Used 
in the Estimation of Electoral Cycles-Type Regressions, EU 1964-97 
Belgium Italy Netherlands Year 
ed  nd  ed  nd  ed  nd  
1965 0.42 0.58 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1966 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.83 0.17 
1967 0.75 0.25 0.58 0.42 0.17 0.83 
1968 0.25 0.75 0.42 0.58 0.00 1.00 
1969 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1970 0.08 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 
1971 0.92 0.08 0.58 0.42 0.33 0.67 
1972 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.58 0.92 0.08 
1973 0.75 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1974 0.25 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1975 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1976 0.67 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.42 
1977 0.33 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.58 
1978 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1979 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1980 0.08 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.42 
1981 0.92 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.58 
1982 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.25 
1983 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1984 0.17 0.83 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1985 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.42 
1986 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.58 
1987 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1988 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.75 
1989 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.25 
1990 0.08 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1991 0.92 0.08 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
1992 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.00 1.00 
1993 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.58 0.42 
1994 0.58 0.42 0.25 0.75 0.42 0.58 
1995 0.42 0.58 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
1996 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.00 1.00 
1997 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.42 
Source: Own calculations based on Table 2. 
Note: See Table A-1. 
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Abstract 
This paper examines whether incumbent national governments of eleven member states of the 
European Union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national 
political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan. The empirical evidence, based on data concerning 
the 1965-97 period, does not support this hypothesis. Rather, it appears that governments have 
pursued stabilization policies. 
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TAXATION AND POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN EU ECONOMIES 
1.  Introduction 
This paper examines whether the national governments of the European Union (EU) 
member states have used tax policies as a means for the stabilization of their economies or for 
their reelection by creating national political business cycles (PBCs). If they have caused 
PBCs did these cycles exhibit comparable patterns over time and, perhaps, narrower in 
amplitude in the post-Maastricht (1992) era than in the preceding period? And in that case 
could these cycles be identified as being of an electoral-type or a partisan-type? Answers to 
such questions may illuminate the perspectives of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
states in respect to the coordination of their tax policies toward an eventual implementation of 
a federal-type fiscal organization in the years to come. These issues are examined for 
democratic societies with majoritarian and proportional political systems. The former systems 
have to do with two major political parties alternating in power; the latter involve a larger 
number of smaller parties and coalition governments.  
The benchmark year 1992 has triggered an era of rising expectations for a gradual loss of 
fiscal autonomy of the EU member states, due to the budget-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP 
criteria imposed by the Treaty of Maastricht. These criteria comprise a subset of the 
conditions required by the member states prior to their accession to the EMU and have to be 
sustained afterwards. Consequently, these requirements are to be reflected in the economic 
policies of national governments, regardless of ideological differences, and, hence, in less 
prominent national PBCs caused by tax policies in the post-1992 era relative to the preceding 
period (see also Alesina et al., 1997, chap.10).  
Political business cycle models feature the idea that, in majoritarian systems, governments 
acting in favor of their own political interests and/or the interests of particular pressure groups 
tend to stimulate aggregate demand in pre-election periods. Their actual policies before 
elections can give rise to electoral (opportunistic) or partisan cycles. Electoral cycles are 
defined as the persistent cyclical patterns of key target- and policy variables regardless of the 
ideological orientation of the incumbent government (Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976). 
Partisan cycles are defined as the persistent differences in such patterns conditional upon the 
ideology of the party in power (see, for instance, Hibbs, 1977, and Haynes and Stone, 1990). 
Both types of models make use of an exploitable Phillips curve. In terms of voters’ 
expectations, these models are considered as retrospective and naive. The counterparts of 
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these models based on rational expectations are classified as rational electoral (Rogoff and 
Sibert, 1988, and Rogoff, 1990) and rational partisan models (Alesina 1987, Alesina and 
Roubini 1993). Proportional political systems, with several parties forming coalition 
governments, are not prone to yield partisan cycles. Through policy moderation, coalition 
governments are slow to react to shocks due to the veto power by their members over the 
choice of policies [Alesina (1987) and Alesina et al. (1997) and the literature cited therein]. 
Moreover, they have a tendency to create larger budget deficits and build up government debt 
[Alesina et al. (1997)]. For a different view see De Haan and Sturm (1977). 
The empirical evidence in connection with PBCs caused by tax instruments is mixed. 
Among the studies lending support to this view are Tufte (1978), Mikesel (1978), Pack 
(1988), Bizer and Durlauf (1989), Cox and McCubbins (1991), Poterba (1994) and Yoo 
(1998). Against this view argue Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Hicks (1984), Karran (1985) 
and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990). With the exception of Yoo, who is concerned with the 
Japanese case, the other studies deal with the US economy. Most recently, Schukneht (2000) 
has examined fiscal policies in pre-election periods in twenty-four developing countries. His 
work indicates increasing public expenditures rather than lowering taxes as a major political 
choice in pre-election periods. 
 Empirical evidence from the majority of eleven member states of the EU reveals a 
narrowing of the divergences observed in the evolution of the structures of direct and indirect 
taxes from the early 1970s to the late 1990s (post Maastricht period) as the coefficients of 
variation in Table 1 indicate.1 A question is whether the above changes reflect stabilization 
through tax policies or are intended pre-election period actions of incumbent governments 
seeking to improve their reelection prospects. In the latter case, it is of interest to investigate 
whether the changes observed during the 1965-97 period can be distinguished in accord with 
the ideological position of the incumbent governments, liberal and socialist, and/or coalition 
type.  
We shall examine the pre- and post-election period influences of incumbent governments 
on the cycles of key target variables and tax instruments as well as the two major components 
of the latter, direct and indirect taxes, in the EU member states during the 1970-97 period.  
 
1 From the fifteen member states of the EU, our analysis excludes Luxembourg due to data unavailability as well 
as Austria, Finland and Sweden are not examined due to the length of our data set (1965-1997) and their so-to-
speak late accession (1995) in the EU. A longer time period was not available due to the lack of statistical data 
concerning various categories of the variables employed in the countries of the sample.  For the same reasons, the 
ten new members of the EU as of spring 2003 are also not examined. 
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Methodological issues are discussed in the following section and a description of the data 
is provided in Section 3. The empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions and 
policy implications are in the last section. 
Table 1: Structure and Percentage Shares of Tax Instruments in GDP,  
European Union States 1968-1997 
Countries/dates TD/T TYP/T TYC/T TP/T TI/T TGS/T TSS/T TOS/T T/GDP TD/IT 
BEL:1968-73 
 1993-97 
50.9 
60.1 
36.3 
46.5 
10.0 
9.6 
4.6 
4.0 
49.1 
39.9 
29.6 
22.9 
16.6 
12.9 
2.9 
4.0 
24.3 
30.5 
1.04 
1.51 
DEN:1968-73 
 1993-97 
60.0 
65.5 
51.0 
56.9 
2.8 
4.7 
6.2 
3.8 
40.0 
34.5 
18.0 
20.8 
18.7 
12.0 
3.4 
1.8 
39.0 
48.1 
1.50 
1.90 
FRA:1968-73 
 1993-97 
35.7 
46.1 
19.9 
26.4 
9.4 
9.3 
6.5 
10.5 
64.3 
53.9 
43.7 
34.1 
19.1 
17.6 
1.4 
2.2 
20.5 
22.6 
0.56 
0.86 
GER:1968-73 
 1993-97 
55.2 
53.4 
 40.9 
 43.1 
8.6 
5.7 
5.7 
4.7 
44.8 
46.6 
23.6 
29.4 
18.7 
15.4 
2.5 
1.8 
23.2 
26.6 
1.23 
1.15 
GRE:1968-73 
 1993-97 
32.9 
34.4 
14.6 
18.9 
3.6 
9.8 
14.7 
5.7 
67.1 
65.6 
26.1 
37.7 
41.0 
27.9 
0.0 
0.0 
14.0 
19.7 
0.49 
0.52 
IRE:1968-73 
 1993-97 
45.5 
54.4 
23.1 
38.0 
7.8 
10.9 
14.6 
5.5 
54.5 
45.6 
14.0 
25.1 
40.4 
20.5 
0.1 
0.0 
26.1 
28.6 
0.83 
1.19 
ITA:1968-73 
 1993-97 
40.6 
60.2 
18.9 
38.5 
11.3 
13.6 
10.3 
8.1 
59.4 
39.8 
21.7 
20.2 
34.3 
15.4 
3.5 
4.2 
16.3 
28.8 
0.68 
1.51 
NET:1968-73 
 1993-97 
58.5 
54.2 
42.0 
33.0 
10.8 
14.1 
5.6 
7.1 
41.5 
45.8 
21.2 
26.1 
19.9 
15.2 
2.4 
4.5 
24.2 
26.4 
1.41 
1.18 
 POR:1968-73 
 1993-97 
40.5 
40.8 
34.2 
37.4 
-
-
6.3 
3.4 
59.5 
59.2 
13.2 
30.7 
43.2 
27.6 
3.0 
0.9 
13.6 
24.7 
0.68 
0.69 
SPA:1968-73 
 1993-97 
43.9 
55.0 
19.1 
36.8 
14.2 
9.4 
10.6 
8.8 
56.1 
45.0 
31.6 
25.1 
24.4 
16.1 
0.2 
3.8 
10.4 
21.8 
0.78 
1.22 
UK:1968-73 
 1993-97 
64.6 
56.9 
38.4 
32.4 
9.7 
11.4 
16.5 
13.1 
35.4 
43.1 
8.0 
24.1 
24.6 
17.0 
2.8 
2.0 
28.3 
28.8 
1.82 
1.32 
 Statistics 
1968-73  
x 48.01 30.75 8.83 4.63 51.99 22.92 27.03 2.03 24.15 1.01 
s 10.24 11.75 3.45 0.71 10.24 9.73 10.45 1.49 6.82 0.43 
V 0.21 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.20 0.42 0.39 0.73 0.28 0.43 
 
1993-97 
 
x 52.82 37.08 10.32 4.07 47.17 26.94 17.96 2.28 20.05 1.19 
 s 8.82 9.84 3.44 0.25 8.82 5.36 5.23 1.61 7.10 0.38 
V 0.17 0.27 0.33 0.44 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.71 0.35 0.32 
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, various issues.   
 Notes: Country initials refer to eleven states of EU.   Symbol – indicates that Portuguese data do not distinguish between TYP and TYC (see 
definitions of variables, below). The tax categories at issue are included in TYP.  
Definitions of variables: TD = direct taxes (current taxes on income and wealth, excluding social security); TI = indirect taxes  (current taxes on 
imports and production). T= TD + TI. TYP = taxes on income of individuals, TYC = taxes on profits of corporations, TP = taxes on the use, 
ownership or transfer of property, TGS = taxes on the production, leasing, transfer, delivery or sales of goods, TSS = excise taxes, TOS = TI – 
(TGS + TSS), and GDP = gross domestic product.  Additional details on the tax variables are given in Section 3. Symbols x , s and V denote 
the average value, standard deviation and coefficient of variation, respectively, of the variables appearing in the respective columns. Due to 
rounding errors, the structures of taxes, TD/T and TI/T, may not add up to 100. 
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2.  Methodology 
According to the expectations hypotheses embodied in the PBC models, these can be 
classified as first or second-generation models. In the former group are the electoral cycle 
(EC) and the partisan cycle (PC) models. In the second group are the rational electoral (REC) 
and the rational partisan cycle (RPC) models.  
Concerning first generation models, the EC models emphasize the incumbent political 
party’s intention to secure reelection by maximizing its expected vote share at the next 
election. To that end, the models hypothesize a backward-looking private sector that judges 
the government by its past track record, and a short-sighted government systematically fooling 
a myopic electorate by judiciously exploiting a short-run Phillips curve trade-off during its 
tenure in office. The resulting EC hypothesis to be tested is: Governments, regardless of 
ideological orientation, adopt expansionary (contractionary) policies in the late (early) year(s) 
of their term in office in order to depress the rate of unemployment (inflation) at the expense 
of a higher inflation (more unemployment). On the other hand, the PC models stress that 
incumbents follow partisan macroeconomic policies. That is, they assign different weights to 
inflation and unemployment, since they represent different pressure groups with dissimilar 
preferences, incentives and objectives. The emerging testable EC hypothesis states that 
socialist or left wing parties give greater weight to unemployment than inflation vis-à-vis right 
wing or liberal parties. The parties might maintain these policies during their tenure in office. 
However, they switch to opportunistic policies if their reelection is in jeopardy (Frey and 
Schneider, 1978). 
Regarding models of the second generation, the REC models emphasize the role of 
temporary information asymmetries in explaining electoral cycles in macroeconomic policy 
instruments, e.g. taxes, transfers, government consumption spending and money growth, 
rather than in indicators of economic performance (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). 
On account of their information advantages, the incumbent governments have an 
incentive to try to signal their competence in pre-election periods by manipulating the policy 
instruments. Their ulterior motive is to revert to their traditional policy actions after the 
election. That is, the end result of their pre-election actions is to fool the public and create 
cycles in the policy instruments, and, conceivably affect the real variables before the election.  
The RPC models consider two ideologically different parties, notably socialists versus 
liberals, with ideologies, objectives and incentives known to an informed and rational public. 
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In the context of a short- run Phillips curve tradeoff, socialists are expected to be more averse 
to unemployment and less averse to inflation than liberals. In turn, rational voters anticipate 
the incentives of the alternative policymakers and form their expectations accordingly. In 
brief, RPC models predict a transitory expansion (contraction) at the beginning of a socialist 
(liberal) administration and a tapering off in the effects of their different policies on inflation 
and unemployment in the later part of their term in office. Inflation is predicted to be 
permanently higher with socialist rather than with liberal administrations. For a survey and 
overview see Gärtner (1994). 
In our empirical analysis we search for basic stylized facts of electoral and partisan 
cycles, retrospective or rational, in tax instruments and key target variables across EU 
economies. To extract the cycle component of a time series, we employ the widely used 
Hodrick-Prescott (1980, 1997) univariate, detrending procedure, hereafter referred to as HP 
filter.  This is a cyclical filter designed to derive a smoothed trend, t , from a given time series 
tz , where tz stands for the series of any tax or target variable considered and is expressed in 
logarithms, unless it is in percentage form. The smoothed trend represents the growth 
component of series tz . Any deviation of the actual time series from its smoothed trend 
defines the cycle component of the series, tdevz  hereinafter. In the empirical analysis we 
focus upon this variable and try to explain it in terms of political dummies and other relevant 
regressors.    
The smoothed trend or growth component of a time series tz , T,...,1t = , t , is obtained 
from the solution of the convex minimization detrending problem: 
])()[()z(min 21tt
1T
2t t1t
T
1t
2
tt
t


= +=
+   , +>0 (1) 
The deviation ttz  is the filtered series and the Lagrange multiplier  is a smoothing 
parameter. At the annual frequency, a value of the smoothing parameter  equal to 100 is 
most often used (Backus and Kehoe (1992), Ravn and Uhlig (1997)).2
In the empirical analysis, we focus upon variable tdevz  and try to explain it in terms of 
political dummies and other relevant regressors. Earlier studies have used as regressands the 
 
2 Theoretically, O can take any value from zero to infinity. When O is equal to infinity (zero) the solution to the 
constrained minimization problem is a linear trend (the original series). Recently, Ravn and Uhlig (1997) have 
strongly recommended a new HP filter adjustment rule, according to which any value of  between 6.25 and 
8.25 is a reasonable choice. Their finding is in agreement with the Baxter and King (1995) proposition that the 
HP filter approximates the ideal band-pass filter when  =10. 
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rates of change of tz ’s or their ratios to GDP, and as arguments of the relevant regressions 
political and non-political dummies. For instance, Alesina and Roubini (1992, 1993), Alesina 
and Peroti (1995) and Schuknecht (2000) have regressed fiscal variables or their ratios to GDP 
on political and non-political dummies. 
In order to detect electoral or partisan cycle regularities of tax and target variables, we 
employ the following procedure. First, we apply HP filtering for each target- and tax 
instrument variable and get the series tdevz . Second, we estimate the regression model (2) at 
various levels of disaggregation of the variables involved. 
 itdevz it
q
1p
*
MMtiptp1t,ii ddddevz 	
 
=
 ++++= (2) 
 
where itdevz  stands for the cycle component of the time series itz of each tax and target 
variable i , i =1,…13, per EU country.3 Symbol iptd denotes the pre- and post- election year 
political dummy variables specific to each EU member country examined (see Section 3). In 
this expression, variables 1t,idevz  and iptd stand for the persistence of the cycle and the 
effects of the political factors, respectively. Variables Mtd and 
*
Md , are two dummies intended 
to capture the impact of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) on the dependent variable. In 
particular, Mtd measures the possible change in the amplitude of the cycle due to the 
Maastricht criteria; it takes a zero value befor  1992 and a value of one otherwise. 
Variable *Md is an interaction dummy intended to capture whether the political effects on the 
dependent variable have been neutralized or weakened in pre-election periods in the aftermath 
of the Treaty. The interaction dummy is defined as the product eMt
*
M ddd = , where ed is a 
pre-election year dummy variable (see end of section 3 for details). The last term in (2) is an 
error term with the usual properties. 
 
3.  The data 
Our empirical analysis concerns eleven EU member countries, notably, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK. It is based on a sample of 33 annual observations covering 1965-1997. There are five 
target variables and eight tax instruments. The target variables include gross domestic product, 
GDP, personal disposable income, YD, private consumption expenditure, C, and the rates of 
 
3 To avoid overburdening the analysis with symbols, a country specific subscript is omitted from all variables in 
(2). 
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7
unemployment u and inflation (rate of change of GDP deflator) . The tax variables include 
direct taxes (current taxes on income and wealth) TD and indirect taxes (taxes linked to 
imports and production) TI as well as their most important sub-categories. In the group of 
direct taxes included are personal income taxes, TYP, corporate income taxes, TYC, and 
property taxes, TP. In the group of indirect taxes included are taxes on general goods and 
services, TGS, taxes on specific goods and services, TSS, and taxes on other goods and 
services, TOS. With the exception of the rates of unemployment and inflation, which are in 
percentage form, the remaining variables are expressed in 1990 prices. The data come from 
the OECD publications National Accounts, Volume II (variables GDP, YD and C), and 
Revenue Statistics (all tax variables) and the Commission of the European Communities, 
European Economy (the remaining variables).4
The dates of parliamentary elections and the types of the government formed are given in 
Table 2. An overview on the information in this table reveals the following: (1) Three 
countries, namely Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, have proportional type 
political systems, which have given rise to coalition governments. (2) The remaining countries 
have a majoritarian system that interchanges two parties in power. (3) In two countries, 
Ireland and Portugal, the two major parties have been non-socialist (Fianna Fail and Fine 
Gael-Labor party) and non-conservative (Socialist and Social Democratic), respectively. (4) In 
France, the control of the presidency and the government has not always been in the hands of 
the same party (cohabitation). (5) In three countries, notably Greece, Portugal and Spain, the 
parliamentary system was suspended for a number of years (Greece, 1967-74) or was revived 
in the mid-seventies (Portugal, 1975; Spain, 1977). Finally, Germany was reunified in 1989. 
On the basis of the outcomes of the national elections  (Table 2), we constructed the pre- 
and post election year dummy variables reported in Tables A-2 and A-3 in the Appendix. In 
doing so we divided particular calendar years according to the proportion of total months in a 
 
4 Variables TYP and TYC include taxes levied on income of individuals and profits (gross income minus allowable tax 
relieves) on corporations, taxes levied on capital gains and gains from gambling. Variable TP covers recurrent 
and non-recurrent taxes on the use, ownership or transfer of property. TGS stands for all taxes, other than import 
and export duties, levied on the production, leasing, transfer, delivery or sales of a wide range of goods and/or 
the rendering of a wide range of services, irrespective of whether they are domestically produced or imported and 
irrespective of the stage of production or distribution at which they are levied, i.e. value-added taxes, sales taxes 
and multi-stage cumulative taxes. TSS includes excise taxes, taxes on profits generated and transferred from fiscal 
monopolies, customs and import duties as well as taxes on exports, foreign exchange transactions, investment 
goods and betting stakes and special taxes on services, which do not form part of a general tax. TOS is a residual 
tax item on receipts from goods and services. Finally, TD = TYP + TYC + TP and TI = TGS + TSS + TOS. All 
variables in levels are expressed at national currencies.  
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year that each party spent in power. The calculations were based on the definition of the 
election year as the 12- month period ending at the end of the month of the election. Thus, ecd
and esd are the election-year dummies associated with the incumbent government  – 
conservative (liberal) and socialist, respectively – administering the election; ncd and nsd are 
the respective post-election year dummies. These political dummy variables were used in 
regression equations designed to test for partisan cycles in the EU countries (sub-section 4.2). 
For the respective regressions intended to test for electoral cycles, we collapsed the above pre-
election year dummies ecd and esd , and the post-election year ones, i.e. ncd and nsd , into two 
dummy variables, notably ed and nd , respectively (sub-section 4.1).
5 Finally, an additional 
dummy, Dd , for Greece, Portugal and Spain was employed. This variable accounted for the time 
intervals these three countries were governed by dictatorial governments, and takes a unit value for 
the periods these countries were under dictatorial rule and zero otherwise.6
5 For the construction of the dummy variables see also Alogoskoufis et.al. (1992).  
6 Variable Dd assumes the value one from 1967 (April) to 1974 (July) in the case of Greece, and for the years 
before 1975 (April) and 1977 (July) for Portugal and Spain, respectively.  
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Table 2. Dates of Parliamentary Elections in EU Countries 
Year BEL DEN FRA GER GRE IRE ITA NET POR SPA UK 
1964  9:SOC CON  CON 2:SOC   COL D D 10:LAB 
1965 5:COL   9:COL  4:FF   D D  
1966  11:CON       D D 4:LAB 
1967   3:CON     4:D   2:COL D D  
1968 3:COL 1:CON 6:CON  D  5:COL  D D  
1969    9:SOC D 6:FF   D D  
1970     D    D D 6:CON 
1971 11:COL 9:MINS   D   4:COL D D  
1972    11:SOC D  5:COL 11:COL D D  
1973  12:MINS 3:CON  D 2:FGL   D D  
1974 3:COL    11:CON    D D 2:10:LAB 
1975  1:SOC       4:SOC D  
1976    10:SOC   6:COL  4:SOC D  
1977 4:COL 2:SOC   10:CON 6:FF  5:COL  6:CON  
1978 12:COL  3:CON         
1979  10:SOC     6:COL  12:SPD 3:CON 5:CON 
1980   6:SOC 10:SOC     10:SPD   
1981 11:COL 12:SOC   6:SOC 6:FGL  5:COL    
1982      2:11:FF  9:COL  10:SOC  
1983    3:CON   6:COL  4:SOC  6:CON 
1984  1:CON          
1985 10:COL    6:SOC    10:SPD   
1986   3:CON     5:COL  6:SOC  
1987 12:COL 9:CON  1:CON  3:FF 6:COL  7:SPD  6:CON 
1988  5:CON 3:SOC         
1989     6:COL 6:FF  9:COL  10:SOC  
1990  12:CON  12:CON 4:CON       
1991 11:COL        10:SPD   
1992      11:FF 4:COL    4:CON 
1993   3:CON  10:SOC     6:MINS  
1994  9:SOC  10:CON   3:COL 5:COL    
1995 5:COL        10:SOC   
1996     9:SOC  4:COL   3:CON  
1997   6:SOC   6:FF     5:LAB 
Sources: Years 1964-1990, Andrikopoulos and Prodromidis (1996). Years 1991-1997, Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections,
Publications of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, Switzerland, annual issues. 
Notes: a. Numbers in cells, preceding types of government, indicate months of election. D = dictatorship era. 
 b. Abbreviations of types of government: 
 1. COL =coalition, 2. CON = conservative, 3. LAB = labor, 4. FF = Fianna Fail coalition,                
 5. FGL = Fine Gael +labor coalition, 6. SPD = social democratic (right), 7. MINS = minority-socialist, 8. SOC = socialist. 
 c. In Ireland (1982), the UK (1974) and Greece (1989) two elections took place, in which FF and FGL, respectively, in Ireland;       
 New Democracy (conservatives) in Greece; and LAB in the UK won the elections. 
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4.  Empirical results 
The empirical analysis is aimed at the detection of electoral and/or partisan cycle 
regularities.  The respective results are discussed in sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2. The effects of 
the Treaty of Maastricht on these cycles are given in sub-section 4.3. 
 
4.1. Electoral cycle regularities  
In order to detect the impact of pre-electoral policies on the formation of cycles of tax 
instruments and target variables in the individual member countries of the EU, regardless of 
the ideology of the government in power, we estimate the following version of the regression 
model (2): 
itdevz itD
q
1p
*
MMtiptp1t,ii dddddevz 	
 +++++= 
=
 (3) 
where itdevz  is the cycle component of the time series of the tax and target variables 
examined. The explanatory variables examined in the country regressions are: (a) the lagged 
dependent variable; (b) political dummy variables, idiosyncratic to the country under 
consideration; (c) a dummy variable Mtd taking a zero value before 1992 (Treaty of 
Maastricht) and a unit value otherwise, and an interaction dummy *Md , i.e., the product of Mtd
and the political dummy etd (see below). For the case of Germany, variable Md is redefined 
to account for the reunification of the country in December 1989. In this case it assumes the 
values zero and one before 1990 and afterwards, respectively. The country political dummies 
iptd are defined as etd and ntd ; they represent the pre-election 12-month period and the post 
election years, but the last one, of the incumbent government, respectively. Variables 1t,idevz  ,
Mtd ,
*
Md , and Dd were used for controlling for the influence of all factors other than the 
political factors in the itdevz  equation. In the estimation of equation (3), we choose 
)q,p(ARMA  specifications as the “best” procedure for reducing short-run noise in all cases in 
which OLS estimates were not satisfactory.7
7 In fact, the various versions of equation (3) were estimated with OLS. To all estimated regressions that 
performed well in terms of the autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and CUSUM (cumulative sum of squares) tests, 
we applied the Newey-West procedure. In all remaining cases we experimented with the ARMA approach. This 
approach involves an iterative three-stage procedure of identification, estimation and diagnostic checking. Model 
identification tools such as SACF (sample autocorrelation function), SPCF (sample partial autocorrelation 
function) were used for identifying adequate models. For model selection we used Schwartz’s SBC as the model 
selection criterion. The optimal order of the model is chosen by the value of m, which is a function of p and q, so 
that SBC(m) is minimum. 
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 For simplicity, after controlling for the other factors potentially influencing the electoral 
cycles of the tax- and the target variables mentioned above, the discussion is mainly restricted 
to the statistically significant estimates of the pre- and post-election year political dummies, as 
well as the effects of the Treaty of Maastricht on the cycles in question. In that respect, we 
present only the direction (signs: plus or minus) of the statistically significant coefficients at 
the 5% probability level of the political dummies in Tables 3-5. 
 
4.1.1. Direct taxes and their components 
The regression results for the electoral cycle regularities in total direct taxes and their major 
components are reported in Table 3 (columns 1-4).  On an overall basis, these results suggest 
that the great majority of the governments in power in the EU countries have not significantly 
propagated political business cycles. The estimates indicate that the insignificant coefficients 
of the political regressors ed and nd have counted for approximately 85% of all estimated 
coefficients of these regressors. This fact alone suggests the robustness of our findings. These 
findings are in agreement with the tax policies pursued by the EU nations in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s for the purpose of reducing their large deficits, which were accumulated in the 
1970s by means of stabilization policies.8 In the remaining cases, where the political 
regressors have significantly affected the cycles of the tax variables, the results were mixed. 
From among these, it is of interest to note that governments in Spain reduced the cycle of the 
corporate income tax in pre-election periods but increased it afterwards. On the other hand, 
governments in Denmark and Germany increased the cycles of property taxes, and personal 
income taxes, respectively, before elections and reduced them in post-election periods.  
 
8 See, for instance, Saunders and Klau (1985), Graham and Seldom (1990) and Aldcroft (2001).  
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TABLE 3: Testing for Electoral Cycles via Regression (3)
Tax  Variables Target    Variables Countries, 
Dummies TD 
(1) 
TYP
(2) 
TYC
(3) 
TP 
(4) 
TI 
(5) 
TGS 
(6) 
TSS 
(7) 
TOS 
(8) 
GDP 
(9) 
YD 
(10) 
C
(11) 
u
(12) 

(13) 
BEL: ed
nd
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
…
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
DEN: ed
nd
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
+
-
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
…
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
FRA: ed
nd
…
…
…
.. 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
-
+
…
... 
 
-
+
-
+
... 
... 
 
-
... 
 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
 
GER: ed
nd
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
+
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
GRE: ed
nd
…
... 
 
+
…
... 
... 
 
…
…
-
+
…
... 
 
... 
…
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
…
... 
... 
 
…
... 
 
IRE: ed
nd
+
…
+
-
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
+
... 
 
…
... 
 
+
... 
 
+
-
…
…
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
…
+
-
ITA: ed
nd
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
…
…
…
-
+
…
... 
 
... 
…
-
+
-
+
…
…
…
…
-
…
NET: ed
nd
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
-
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
... 
... 
 
POR: ed
nd
…
-
…
-
…
... 
 
…
-
-
... 
-
…
-
…
-
+
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
-
+
…
... 
 
…
+
SPA: ed
nd
…
... 
 
-
+
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
... 
... 
 
+
... 
 
-
+
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
U.K: ed
nd
…
…
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
-
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
…
…
+
…
…
... 
 
…
... 
 
-
+
Note: The definitions of the tax-and target variables appearing in the various cells are given in Section 3. 
The statistically significant coefficients, at the 5% level, are reported by their plus or minus signs. The 
three dots, … , signify statistically insignificant coefficients. 
4.1.2. Indirect taxes and their components  
 The statistically significant estimates of the political regressors in Table 4 (columns 5-
8) represent only the 24% of all relevant estimated coefficients. From these, only the results 
pertaining to the cycles of total indirect taxes in Greece, taxes on general goods and 
Page 38 of 50
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13
services in France and Italy, taxes on specific goods and services in Spain and taxes on 
other goods and services in France and Portugal are consistent with the electoral cycle 
hypothesis.  
 
4.1.3.Target variables    
Finally, the statistically significant coefficients associated with the cycles of the 
target variables (Table 3, columns 9-13) do not exceed 15% of all related estimates. These 
latter estimates suggest that incumbent governments have managed to decrease in pre-election 
periods the cycles of real GDP in France and Italy, real disposable income in Italy, real private 
consumption expenditure in Portugal and the rate of inflation in the UK, but increased them in 
post election periods. In Ireland, government actions led to increases of the cycle of the rate of 
inflation before elections and decreases after elections.  
In relation to the above results, earlier studies employing different country samples and 
time periods have detected evidence for electoral cycles in tax instruments. In particular, Tufte 
(1978), using the1961-72 US data, found that tax increases were most probable in post- than 
pre-election years (our emphasis). Poterba (1994), using US data at the state level for the 
1988-92 period, confirmed the hypothesis that tax increases are significantly smaller prior to 
gubernatorial elections than afterwards. Pack (1987, 1988) provides evidence for politically 
motivated business cycles on the revenue- but not on the expenditure side of the budget in the 
US for the 1957-81 time span. By using panel data from a sample of twenty OECD countries 
for the 1960-87 period, Alesina and Roubini (1993) provide evidence of electoral-type cycles 
on monetary and fiscal (taxes, government spending) variables. Yoo (1998) finds a political 
tax cycle in Japan during the 1953-92 period. Schuknecht (2000), using a sample of twenty-
four developing countries for the 1973-92 period, finds that incumbent governments tend to 
increase public investment rather than lowering taxes prior to elections.  
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4.2. Partisan cycle regularities 
To detect whether conservative (liberal) or socialist administrations have exerted political 
influence on the cycles of the tax and target variables, we estimated an alternative version of 
the regression model (3).9 In that version we reinterpreted the political dummies iptd to 
account for the potential impact on the economy of each of the two parties, when in power, 
before and after the elections. The construction of the political dummy variables at issue is 
discussed in Section 3. As in the preceding section, we present only the direction (signs: plus 
or minus) of the statistically significant coefficients of the political dummies in Table 4.10 
The regression results for partisan-cycle regularities in tax instruments and target 
variables are reported in Table 4. The results are similar to those discussed for the electoral 
cycle regularities. This implies that the great majority of the EU governments, conservative or 
socialist, did not significantly affect the cycles of the tax- and target variables involved. In the 
following subsections we briefly discuss results consistent with partisan cycles.   
 
4.2.1. Direct and indirect taxes and their components 
The statistically significant coefficients in the partisan cycle regressions concerning direct taxes 
and their components indicate that (a) conservatives in Spain decreased the cycle of the corporate 
income tax before election periods and increased it after elections; and (b) socialists in Germany and 
Spain reduced the cycle of direct taxes and property taxes, respectively in pre- election periods but 
reversed their policies after elections. Concerning indirect taxes, conservatives in Portugal (Social 
Democrats) and Spain reduced the cycles of taxes on specific goods and services in pre-election 
periods, but reversed their policies afterwards. Similar policies were pursued by socialist 
administrations in France and Germany in relation to the cycle of taxes on other goods and services. 
The remaining results do not conform to the requirements of partisan cycles. Hence, no case can be 
made for partisan cycle regularities in direct and indirect taxes throughout the EU for the period of the 
sample. 
4.2.2 Target variables 
The statistically significant estimates for the target variables indicate that both parties 
(taken separately), when in power, have mainly reduced the partisan cycles of the variables 
involved (Table 4, columns 9-13). More specifically, in pre-election periods, socialists in 
 
9 The three countries with a proportional political system, notably, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, are not 
examined here.  
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France, Germany and Ireland (Fine-Gael/Labor coalition), and conservatives in Portugal 
(Social Democrats) and Spain have reduced the cycles of various categories of the target 
variables cited in Table 4.  It  is  of  interest  to  note  here that most conservative governments 
TABLE 4: Testing for Partisan Cycles via Regression (3) 
Tax Variables Target Variables Countries, 
Dummies TD 
(1) 
TYP
(2) 
TYC
(3) 
TP 
(4) 
TI 
(5) 
TGS 
(6) 
TSS 
(7) 
TOS 
(8) 
GDP 
(9) 
YD 
(10) 
C
(11) 
u
(12) 

(13) 
DEN: dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
...  
... 
... 
-
... 
…
…
-
…
+
…
…
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
-
…
…
…
FRA:dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
 
+
... 
... 
+
+
-
…
…
…
-
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
…
-
... 
+
... 
-
... 
... 
 
... 
-
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
+
... 
... 
 
-
-
... 
... 
 
GER:dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
 
... 
-
... 
+
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
-
... 
+
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
-
... 
... 
 
-
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
-
... 
... 
 
... 
-
... 
... 
 
GRE:dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
+
-
... 
... 
 
…
-
+
-
-
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
-
…
…
+
…
... 
... 
-
... 
 
-
... 
... 
... 
 
IRE:dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
 
+
... 
... 
-
…
+
…
…
-
... 
... 
... 
 
+
... 
... 
... 
 
+
+
... 
... 
 
+
+
... 
-
+
... 
... 
... 
 
…
+
-
+
…
…
…
…
... 
_
... 
... 
 
+
-
…
…
... 
... 
... 
+
-
... 
... 
+
POR:dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
 
... 
... 
... 
-
... 
…
... 
-
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
+
-
_
... 
+
... 
 
…
... 
+
... 
 
_
... 
+
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
-
-
+
-
... 
 
... 
+
…
+
_
... 
... 
+
SPA:dec 
des 
dnc 
 dns  
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
-
+
+
…
…
-
…
+
_
…
…
+
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
_
... 
+
+
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
_
... 
... 
... 
 
_
+
... 
... 
 
_
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
+
... 
... 
... 
 
U.K:dec 
des 
dnc 
dns 
 
…
…
…
+
…
…
…
+
…
…
…
…
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
+
-
... 
... 
 
... 
-
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
+
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
+
... 
-
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
... 
 
... 
... 
... 
+
Note: The definitions of the tax-and target variables appearing in the various cells are given in Section 
3. The statistically significant coefficients, at the 5% level, are reported by their plus or minus signs. 
The three dots, … , signify statistically insignificant coefficients. 
10 The detailed estimates of the above cycles of tax- and target variables as functions of the political dummies and 
other non-political regressors are available upon request. 
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reduced the cycle of the rate of inflation in pre-election periods. In conclusion, the empirical 
evidence does not lend support to partisan cycle regularities in the key target variables 
examined in the EU countries under consideration during the period of the sample11.
4.2.3 Treaty of Maastricht and cycles of instruments and targets 
The impact of the Treaty of Maastricht on the cycles of the tax instruments and the 
target variables examined, as measured by the statistically significant coefficients of the 
dummy variables Mtd and *Md (regression 3) in the eleven EU member countries, is reported 
in Table 5. The statistically significant estimates correspond to about 15% of all cases 
considered. This suggests that the impact of the Treaty of Maastricht on the cycles in question 
in the post 1992 era has been limited. This is justified by the fact that most of the countries 
involved had already been in a process of tax policy convergence, long before the initiation of 
the Treaty, with the ultimate objective of forming the EMU in the future.12 
TABLE 5: Impact of Treaty of Maastricht on Cycles of Tax- and Target Variables 
Dummies in regressions of: 
Tax Variables Target Variables 
Countries 0>Mtd 0<Mtd 0* >Md 0
* <Md 0>Mtd 0<Mtd 0* >Md 0* <Md
BEL … … TD,TYP,TYC … … … YD … 
DEN … TD … … … … C … 
FRA … TGS TI, TGS … … GDP,C GDP,YD, C … 
GER … … … … … … … …
GRE … … TI TYP … … … … 
IRE TSS … … … U … … …
ITA TYP … TP … … YD YD, U …
NET … TYP TYP … … … … … 
POR TD,TYP … TGS,TOS TD,TYP … U … …
SPA … TYP TYP,TYC TGS … … … u 
UK TP … TGS … … … U …
Note: The definitions of the tax-and target variables appearing in the various cells are given in Section 3. The 
statistically significant coefficients (5% level) of the Maastricht related dummies in the EU country regressions of 
the cycles of the variables at issue are reported by their plus or minus signs. The three dots, … , signify statistically 
insignificant coefficients. 
11 Following different methodologies, Heckelman (2001) and Bratsiotis (2000) cannot find conclusive evidence 
in support of the rational partisan model in the cases of the UK (for GDP growth and unemployment) and Greece 
(for inflation), respectively. 
12 The source of the information in this table is estimates of regression (3) in association with the search of 
electoral cycles. Degrees of freedom problems prevented comparable estimates for the case of partisan cycles. 
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5. Summary and conclusion 
In this paper we have searched for electoral and partisan cycle regularities in tax 
instruments and target variables in eleven EU member countries for the 1965-1997 period. 
The conclusion emerging from the empirical analysis does not lend support to the presence of 
electoral- or partisan cycle type hypotheses in the EU. Indications of political business cycles 
in the tax instruments and the target variables used are scanty. The great majority of the results 
suggest that the national governments of the EU countries did not take policy actions leading 
to the creation of electoral or partisan cycles in tax instruments and target variables. Our 
findings rather suggest that the EU governments have been primarily concerned with the 
pursuit of stabilization policies rather than with policies giving rise to political cycles, with the 
intent of curing the inflation and unemployment problems of the 1970s and 1980s. This result 
is encouraging, in the sense that it underlies a convergence of the tax policies pursued by the 
majority of the individual member countries of the Union in the pre-1997 period. It therefore 
facilitates the task of the European Commission in leading toward a federal type tax policy in 
the EMU in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A- 1. Election and Post Election Year Dummy Variables Used in the Estimation 
of Partisan Cycles-Type Regressions, EU 1964-1997 
Denmark France Germany Greece Year 
ecd esd ncd nsd ecd esd ncd nsd ecd esd ncd nsd ecd esd ncd nsd
1964 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1965 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.0.0 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1966 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1967 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1968 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1969 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1970 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1971 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1973 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.00 
1975 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1976 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 
1977 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 
1978 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1979 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 
1981 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.17 
1982 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1983 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1984 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
1985 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
1986 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1987 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1988 0.42 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
1989 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
1990 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 
1991 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1992 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 
1993 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.17 
1994 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 
1996 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table A- 1 (continued) Election and Post Election Year Dummy Variables Used in the 
Estimation of Partisan Cycles-Type Regressions, EU 1964-97 
Ireland Portugal Spain United Kingdom Year 
ecd esd ncd nsd ecd esd ncd nsd ecd esd ncd nsd ecd esd ncd nsd
1964 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 
1965 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 
1966 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 
1967 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1968 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1969 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 
1970 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1971 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1972 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1973 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1976 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1977 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1978 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.42 
1979 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.58 0.00 
1980 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1981 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1984 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1986 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.42 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1987 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 
1988 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1989 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1991 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.00 
1992 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 
1993 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1994 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1995 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
1996 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.42 0.00 
1997 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.58 
 Source: Own calculations based on Andrikopoulos and Prodromidis (1996) and Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections, 
Publications of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, Switzerland (annual issues) for the years 1964-1990 and 1991-97, 
respectively. 
 Note: All countries with proportional political systems are not included in this analysis. Sweden is also not included due to 
her late accession to the EU. See text. 
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Table A-2. Election and Post Election Year Dummy Variables Used 
in the Estimation of Electoral Cycles-Type Regressions, EU 1964-97 
Belgium Italy Netherlands Year 
ed nd ed nd ed nd
1965 0.42 0.58 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1966 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.83 0.17 
1967 0.75 0.25 0.58 0.42 0.17 0.83 
1968 0.25 0.75 0.42 0.58 0.00 1.00 
1969 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1970 0.08 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 
1971 0.92 0.08 0.58 0.42 0.33 0.67 
1972 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.58 0.92 0.08 
1973 0.75 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1974 0.25 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1975 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1976 0.67 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.42 
1977 0.33 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.58 
1978 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1979 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1980 0.08 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.42 
1981 0.92 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.58 
1982 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.25 
1983 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1984 0.17 0.83 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1985 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.42 
1986 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.58 
1987 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
1988 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.75 
1989 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.25 
1990 0.08 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
1991 0.92 0.08 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
1992 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.00 1.00 
1993 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.58 0.42 
1994 0.58 0.42 0.25 0.75 0.42 0.58 
1995 0.42 0.58 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
1996 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.00 1.00 
1997 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.42 
Source: Own calculations based on Table 2. 
Note: See Table A-1. 
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Submitted Manuscript. Page 16 of original manuscript:
(1) At the end of the third line from above, the following footnote (number 11) should be 
added:
Following different methodologies, Heckelman (2001) and Bratsiotis (2000) cannot find conclusive 
evidence in support of the rational partisan model in the cases of the UK (for GDP growth and 
unemployment) and Greece (for inflation), respectively.
(2)   References. Two additional articles have been added.
Bratsiotis, G.J., 2000. Political Parties and Inflation in Greece: The Metamorphosis of the 
Socialist Party on the Way to EMU. Applied Economics Letters, 7, 451-454.
Heckelman, J.C., 2001. The Econometrics of Rational Partisan Theory. Applied 
Economics, 33, 417-426.
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